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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to look at the extent of 
legislative oversight in the North Dakota State Legislature. 
The State's legislators meet only once every two years for 
about four months and the rest of the time they are full­
time private citizens and parttime legislators. Oversight 
of North Dakota's Executive Branch must be done by legisla­
tors who are being pulled in several directions by job, 
family and constituents. Oversight does not rate high on 
the priority list in the legislative interim.
In order to get an idea of what types of oversight are 
available to the State's legislators, this study compares 
congressional oversight to State oversight techniques. The 
similarities are interesting. While there is quite a bit 
written about congressional oversight, little study has 
been done on state oversight.
In order to get a handle on oversight methods avail­
able to North Dakota's legislators and the methods actually 
used by them a series of interviews were conducted. Chester 
Nelson, the Legislative Council's fiscal analyst and auditor 
was interviewed concerning fiscal oversight available to the 
State's legislators. John Olsrud, Director of the Legisla­
tive Council staff, talked about the role of the council 
staff in assisting legislators in oversight. And finally, 
fourteen of the State's legislators were interviewed to 




Oversight by Congress is a tremendous undertaking and 
a seemingly impossible task. The branches of the executive 
spread all over the country, making oversight hard at best. 
The State Legislature, although on a smaller scale, has much 
the same problem which is made more difficult because of a 
parttime, citizen legislative body in North Dakota.
State programs and thus state agencies are becoming 
more numerous as the federal government continues to shift 
control of many programs to the states. Many of these 
programs are not new, but they are new to state government 
control.
In many ways, oversight is just another way to refer to 
accountability and that is what this study will try to pin­
point . More and more the public is demanding accountability 
in government, and they are making those demands directly to 
their elected representatives, whether they be national or 
state.
The study will look at the definition and scope of 
legislative oversight of the federal executive and the 
methods of oversight used by the Congress. Many of the same
1
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methods or similar techniques are available to State legis­
lators in North Dakota and the discussion of federal over­
sight methods will also include a comparison of the North 
Dakota methods in each given category. This will comprise 
Chapter Two of the study.
The decision to look at legislative oversight by 
Congress was made for two reasons. First, Congress is the 
leader in oversight techniques and an understanding of how 
Congress tries to oversee the Federal Executive Branch, 
makes it easier to relate those concepts to the state level, 
compare them and put them in perspective. Second, the States 
so often copy the federal government's way of doing things, 
that a look at congressional oversight seemed a natural 
extension of the study.
There is very little written about legislative oversight 
on the state level and almost nothing on legislative over­
sight in North Dakota. Time and money were limitations in 
doing any type of mail or phone survey, so interviews with 
state legislators were done during the 11th Biennial Summit 
Conference for State Officials which was held on the UND 
campus March 11-13, 1990. A total of 14 interviews with 
legislators were taped during the summit, as well as inter­
views with John Olsrud, Director of the Legislative Council, 
and Chester Nelson, Legislative Budget Analyst and Auditor.
The comments from North Dakota Legislators and John 
Olsrud will be looked at in Chapter Three of the study. At
3
that time an explanation of the method of questioning and 
other aspects of the interview process will be detailed.
Chapter Four will consist of a conclusion on oversight 
in general and more specifically its importance in the 
governmental process in North Dakota.
CHAPTER TWO
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: A BACKGROUND
In the years 1940 and 1941, two respected political 
scientists found themselves at opposite ends on the argument 
of responsibility over program implementation and evaluation 
in the federal government. Carl Friedrich believed in 
administrative responsibility, while Herman Finer countered 
that responsibility over public policy was the legislature's.
Friedrich maintained that the administrator in the 
executive branch must be trusted with implementing and 
redefining legislative policy. "All institutional safe­
guards designed to make public policy . . . truly responsible
1represent approximations at that." Friedrich was convinced 
that once Congress had passed the initial legislation and 
turned over implementation to the bureaucracy, that events 
moved far too rapidly for any further legislative involve­
ment .
The continuously changing pattern of our society, 
requires that the administrator be responsive to 
whatever trends may be affecting his activities.
Laws do not embody static and universal truths; they 
represent expedient policies which are subject to 
continuous change and must be so considered.
Instead of administering according to precedent, 




Friedrich believed that within the parameters of the
law the administrator had a duty to do everything possible
to make programs work. "[T]he most far-reaching of public
policies are often formed by executive agencies under the
pressure of circumstance and are merely legalized by subse-
3quent legislation."
While Friedrich made some valid points in his argument 
and had many supporters, Herman Finer found the idea of non- 
elected public servants deciding their own course of action, 
with little or no congressional direction, hard to swallow. 
"[T]he servants of the public are not to decide their own 
course; they are to be responsible to the elected repre­
sentatives of the public, and these are to determine the
4course of action . . . ."
Finer felt the most important aspect of democratic 
government is that the public and its elected representa­
tives work together to force the direction which government 
should take and what actions administrative officials are to 
pursue. Most important of all, is the demand for obedience 
from the bureaucracy. "The devices for securing the con­
tinuing responsiveness of the official are, of course, the 
law courts, the procedure of criticism, question, debate, 
and fact finding . . . and the election of . . . officials
5and their recall."
In many ways, the two arguments boiled down to moral 
responsibility on the one hand and political responsibility
on the other. Friedrich believed the administrator has the
6
moral obligation to implement and form public policy. Finer,
on the other hand, saw it completely different.
[P]olitical responsibility is the major concern of 
those who work for healthy relationships between 
the officials and the public, and moral responsibility, 
although a valuable conception and institutional form, 
is minor and subsidiary.6
It may be that Friedrich was right in assuming adminis­
trators control through a moral obligation and legislators, 
except for a very few, intervene only when it is politically 
expedient. However, legislative oversight takes on many 
forms other than the headline grabbing or constituency 
pleasing hearings as will be shown in this study.
It should come as no surprise that Finer found many 
supporters in the legislative branch. By 1946, Congress 
decided it was time to define oversight and who was 
responsible. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
detailed in very clear terms what congressional oversight 
entailed. The act states that each standing committee will 
take the responsibility to,
exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution 
by the administrative agencies concerned of any 
laws, the subject of which is within the jurisdiction 
of such committee.^
One change in the official definition has been made. In the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress substituted 
the words "continuous watchfulness" with the words "review
gand study."
A better definition of legislative oversight comes from 
Morris Ogul. He describes oversight as, ". . . behavior by
7
legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively,
which results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic 
9behavior." The behavior does not necessarily mean whole- 
scale hearings, but checking of one sort or another. It can 
be checking by the whole Congress or just an individual 
member of Congress or even a staff person. The impact can 
be large or amount to very little. However, whether large 
or small, the agency is aware that somebody is watching them.
In many ways, oversight in Congress is a continuous 
process that members of Congress do consciously and at times 
unconsciously. However, even though Congress, through 
legislation in 1946, 1970, and 1974, has recognized the 
need for oversight of the executive and has given committees 
expanded oversight powers, the whole idea of oversight still 
ranks low on the priority lists of most members of Congress.
Members of Congress see a brighter future in legislative 
involvement and constituent service than oversight. They 
tend to see the bureaucracy as a maze which they can never 
penetrate and which could be hazardous to one's political 
health.
Members of Congress will also establish close relation­
ships with people and agencies in the bureaucracy that 
aggressive oversight could destroy. But at the same time 
they are doing a certain amount of individual oversight. 
Loyalty to the President can also put a damper on over­
sight by members of Congress. While these reasons for the 
lack of aggressive oversight carry some legitimacy, probably
8
the most obvious reason for lack of oversight is that there
4 . -i 10are no external pressures.
Taking the premise a step further, it seems that even 
when there is some pressure, members of Congress and con­
gressional committees will only become involved when they 
can "make rational decisions about the allocation of their 
scarce personal resources . . . so as to maximize gains to
themselves in things which they value and minimize losses 
in those things."'*''*'
Seymour Sher says that reasons for oversight can be to
embarrass the President, to counter outside pressure, to
revise regulations, to settle turf battles with the executive
12or to expose evidence that will damage the opposition.
While this idea of oversight seems almost petty and vindica­
tive, it is not always that way. Some oversight is done for 
the grander purpose of making sure the executive is toeing 
the line and meeting objectives laid out within authorized 
spending limits. However, make no mistake, oversight is 
almost always political in nature.
Legislative oversight became a reality as policy 
initiation shifted from the legislative branch to the 
executive branch. While the terms congressional oversight 
or legislative oversight tend to connote oversight by the 
whole legislative body, the actual oversight is much more a 
function of committees in most instances followed by 
individual investigation.
9
After the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 both
the House and Senate created committees to oversee government
activities. The Committees on Government Operations in each
house (HCGO and SCGO), have as their power base Public Law
601, Rule, XI(H) which states that the committees will study,
"the operation of Government Activities at all levels with
13a view to determining its economy and efficiency."
The Public Law is actually a statement of intent and
does not define committee action. In fact, it places three
limitations on the committees' behavior. "[I]nvestigations
must focus upon administrative agencies; the review is to
be of policy execution not policy itself; and the committee
14is to investigate not legislate." It is with this law 
that the Congress finds itself dealing with the same type of 
vague guidelines it regularly hands the bureaucracy.
There is obviously little in the way of an overall 
policy toward oversight by the Congress. So, both committees, 
"[i]n the absence of a strong definition of larger goals 
. . . [have] turned to the personal needs and interests of
15individual members for a definition of committee concerns."
The two committees are empowered to issue subpoenas and they 
are allowed to sit while Congress is not in session. There 
are also very few limitations on the substantive content of 
any study they may want to conduct, so they can cut a pretty 
wide path.
With all their broad investigative powers, subcommittee 
structures, and other special aspects of their existence.
10
one would believe the HCGO and SCGO would have enjoyed great
success in augmenting the work of the authorizing and
appropriations committees in oversight. However, that has
not been the case. Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott have
detailed several reasons for the failure.
The ability to investigate policy administration 
and enforce proper policy implementation effectively 
requires the authority to write legislation . . . .
The Government Operations Committees have lacked 
these powers. The . . . committees are constrained
by the jealousies and animosities that other com­
mittees show them. Because of this hostility the 
Government Operations Committees become leary of any 
action which might hurt their funding, staff assign­
ments, or a total disregard of recommendations.^
Over time, the two committees have tended toward
consulting with other committees whose jurisdiction they may
be entering, looking for compromise. They tend to be
. . . restrained in their use of publicity, [they]
constrict investigations to avoid direct conflict 
with other committees, and rarely conclude investiga­
tions by proposing specific legislative solutions 
to problems they may uncover.-*-'
It is obvious that the attempt by both houses of 
Congress to centralize oversight in the two Government 
Operations Committees has not worked. The response to this 
problem has been to give substantive committees oversight 
powers. Since the Reorganization Act of 1974, oversight 
has become much more the responsibility of substantive 
subcommittees.
This sharing of responsibility for oversight has created 
its own problems. "[T]he decentralization trends . . . have
made the conduct of oversight even more problematic. In
11
fact, the decentralization of congressional committees has
18led to an oversight paradox." The paradox seems to be 
that while decentralization of oversight opens up more 
access points for members within the system, it also spreads 
out the power and probably weakens the ability of Congress 
to oversee.
Of course there are arguments for both sides. One side 
believes that if a committee oversees many agencies there is 
less chance the committee will be influenced by any one 
agency. However, others contend that with a decentralized 
subcommittee system, the agency is many times the only reason 
for the subcommittee's existence and therefore, control of 
the situation can shift to the agency thus leading to 
watered down or no oversight at all. A third argument holds 
that the oversight capabilities of subcommittees have been 
strengthened with larger staffs and more access to informa­
tion. This argument holds that there has actually been more 
enthusiasm for oversight under the present committee system.
Even if there were more enthusiasm for oversight, which 
is highly questionable, one fact still remains:
Most studies of congressional oversight are quick 
to point out that among the various functions of the 
members of Congress, including legislative, repre­
sentation, and policy surveillance, oversight ranks 
low.
Members of Congress have a hard time finding any political 
hay in oversight. It would be unusual to see a member of 
Congress rely on their oversight activities to sway voters 
in a re-election bid.
12
While this picture of congressional oversight looks 
bleak, there is, in fact, a lot of oversight that is carried 
out. There are also many ways in which it is accomplished. 
Not all of them revolve around the committee system. The 
next section deals with methods of oversight on the national 
scene and in North Dakota.
Oversight Methods and Techniques: Comparisons
Congress has at its fingertips a whole array of methods 
for oversight. In this section of Chapter Two, this study 
takes a look at the more often used methods of congressional 
oversight methods with those available to North Dakota 
legislators.
As the research for this study unfolded, it became 
clear that many of the oversight methods used by Congress 
are also available to legislators in North Dakota in some 
form or another. However, in North Dakota most of these 
oversight methods are not used, either through ignorance of 
their existence of because of the parttime nature of the 
legislator or both.
In this section, each of the more commonly used over­
sight methods will be headlined followed by a discussion of 
congressional use and then use of the oversight method by 
North Dakota legislators. A portion of this section will 
also rely on information from Chester Nelson, Legislative 




This area of oversight is probably the most common and 
yet it would probably be safe to say that members of Congress 
do not look at this part of the job as oversight. Each 
member of Congress handles thousands of requests from con­
stituents for help in solving one problem or another. "The 
requests range from inquiries about lost Social Security
checks or delayed pension payments to disaster relief
„ 1assistance . . . .
In most congressional offices, the requests or com­
plaints are handled by staff members assigned to case work. 
Much of this is forwarded to Washington, D.C. by the con­
gressional staff in the member's home district or state.
In some instances, depending on the type of request or the 
person requesting help, the representative or senator will 
handle the request personally. Even if the personal touch 
is not given, all results and responses coming out of the 
respective offices give the impression that the member of 
Congress handled the matter personally.
The oversight comes into play because in order to take 
care of most of the requests, an agency of the executive 
must be contacted. If a problem arises in solving the 
situation or the agency seems hesitant to help or tries to 
stall, a member of Congress could bring the matter up before 
the proper committee or even discuss it on the floor of the 
House or Senate. While this rarely happens, agencies know
14
it could, and are usually quick to help. "Casework has the
positive effect of bringing quirks in the administrative
2machxnery to members attention."
North Dakota legislators are faced with the same 
requests although in much smaller numbers. Most North 
Dakota legislators understand the need to respond to con­
stituent requests. The response to constituent requests 
differs in two ways on the state level as compared to 
Congress. To begin with, North Dakota legislators do not 
have staff, so any dealings with executive agencies on 
behalf of constituents are done personally. Also, many 
times the response to constituents' requests by the legisla­
tor comes in the form of legislation introduced in the next 
legislative session.
The Legislative Council staff is used extensively by 
some state legislators, although many do not bother. They 
feel the Council staff is too busy to handle their requests. 
The legislators themselves use phone calls, the mail, and 
personal visits to departments to take care of constituent 
problems. This service by the North Dakota legislators 
works to keep them informed and creates a degree of oversight 
of the executive between sessions.
The Concurrent Resolution or Legislative Veto
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the legisla­
tive veto was unconstitutional. While the so-called Chadha
decision still stands and has not been overruled or modified.
15
neither has congressional practice concerning the use of the 
legislative veto.
In its true form, the legislative veto is nothing more
than a concurrent resolution:
The term legislative veto . . . refers to the
incorporation within a delegatory statute of a con­
gressional power by concurrent resolution or simple 
resolution of one house to enable executive action 
under the statute, to approve or disapprove such 
action, or to terminate the statutory grant of 
power.3
While legislation under the terms of the Constitution
is to be sent to the president for his signature or veto,
the Congress has held the belief that concurrent resolutions
do not fall under the constitutional guidelines. Rather,
Congress has held that the resolutions are not legislative
4and do not have any effect outside the capitol. Up to a
point, this is true. A vast majority of congressional
resolutions deal with such mundane things as congratulations
to someone or some organization, or problems with capitol
grounds parking or maintenance.
At other times the concurrent resolutions have been
used to require reports from bureaus at specific times or
budget reports at times other than the yearly budget sessions.
For the most part, presidents have put up with this type of
oversight. At other times that has not been the case. At
those times Congress is usually being very heavy handed.
[I]n some instances it has reserved power to termi­
nate a statute or program by concurrent resolution.
It has asserted power to enable or require executive 
action by concurrent resolution. Finally it has 
made administrative exercise of delegated power
16
subject to congressional approval or disapproval 
by concurrent or simple resolution.^
It was this kind of heavy-handedness by Congress that
Chadha was to have ended. While that has been the case, it
seems that the legislative veto is more sophisticated now.
It is seen by both the executive and legislative personnel
as a necessary function of some legislation. The following
statement made in 1956 seems to hold true today.
Experience with the concurrent resolution indicates 
that Congress is more imaginative in fashioning 
tools for checking and influencing the administra­
tion of delegated powers than it is skillful and 
determined in employing them to hold administrators 
to clearly defined standards of performance.̂
The effectiveness of the concurrent resolution or legisla­
tive veto as an oversight tool is still in question.
The North Dakota Legislature does not use the legisla­
tive veto. That is to say, not in the way of Congress. Much 
the same effect, however, is created with Budget Section 
authorizat ions.
The Budget Section is a legislative interim committee 
consisting of the Lieutenant Governor, the leadership of 
both houses, and selected members of the appropriations 
committees in the House and Senate. While there is some 
question as to the constitutionality of the Budget Section, 
the fact remains that it has statutory powers within the 
North Dakota Century Code and extra authorization powers 
granted during each biennial session of the legislature.
North Dakota Century Code (NDCC) 50-06-05.1(18), 
provides that the Department of Human Services may terminate
17
food stamp programs under certain conditions, but only with
Budget Section approval. NDCC 54-16-01 allows Emergency
Commission transfers from the state contingency fund in
excess of 500-thousand dollars only with approval of the
7Budget Section.
Examples of legislative delegation of approval also 
abound. During the 1987 legislative session. House Bill 
1005 provided for appropriations of up to one-million dollars 
in gifts for construction of a facility for the Agriculture 
Extension Service, but only with Budget Section approval.
And Senate Bill 2471 during the same session, required 
approval of the Budget Section before any spending of funds 
for a child welfare research bureau at the University of 
North Dakota would be allowed.
While withholding of approval by the Budget Section is 
rare, the reality of the concept is that some major spending, 
authorized by the legislature, could in fact be held from 
the executive branch by the Budget Section. A potentially 
powerful oversight tool exists with the Budget Section.
The power to hold the executive accountable for actions in 
many areas rests in the collective hands of the members of 
the Budget Section.
The question of the constitutionality of the Budget 
Section comes from delegation of authority. Does the Budget 
Section constitute illegal delegation of authority? While 
this study will not pass judgment one way or the other, 
those who question the legality of the Budget Section cite
18
the State Constitution. Basically the constitution says 
that all matters of fiscal policy in North Dakota must be 
approved by both houses of the legislature in a vote of all 
the members of the legislature. The Budget Section and with 
it the Emergency Commission have the power to make fiscal 
changes in the interim without a vote of all the members of 
both houses.
Hearings and Investigations
Hearings and investigations are the traditional over­
sight techniques used by Congress. Hearings in Congress are 
held on a regular basis. Representatives of departments or 
agencies in the executive are called to testify before 
subcommittees or authorization committees all year long.
They testify on matters of implementation of programs, 
pending legislation which may affect the department or 
agency, or most often in defense of their budget requests.
Investigations are held when Congress becomes aware of 
possible wrongdoing in the executive branch or mismanagement 
of programs or program funds by a department or agency. 
Legally, investigations by Congress are to be held with the 
idea of future legislation in mind. However, this is not 
always the case as evidenced by the McCarthy hearings in the 
early 1950s.
While most hearings tend to escape a lot of public 
scrutiny, many investigations become national news. The
19
most recent examples are the HUD mismanagement hearings, 
Iran-Contra, and of course Watergate.
It is in the regularly scheduled congressional committee 
hearings that the bulk of legislative oversight is conducted. 
Since the Reorganization Act of 1974, the chances for 
increased oversight have become more plentiful. "[I]n com­
mittees where subcommittees are accorded a prominent role in 
policy-making, there will be a greater opportunity for over­
sight activity than is the case in committees where sub-
9committees play a more restricted role."
The increase in staff accorded the subcommittees has 
also had an influence on strengthening the idea of con­
gressional hearings as oversight tools. "Committee staff 
members can be used as effective communications links with 
administrative agencies . . . as a means of transmitting
congressional views to specific a g e n c i e s . T h e  flow of 
information therefore returns from the agencies to the com­
mittee members through the staff.
It seems that the more active and aggressive the 
committee or subcommittee is, the greater the amount of 
oversight activity. However, all too often, the important 
senior members of a committee or subcommittee who are, "in 
the best position to make the committee active in oversight, 
find that their priorities lie elsewhere and therefore 
devote little of their valuable time to the committee, or
oversight. 11
20
Time is a problem for all members of Congress. Members 
are constantly being pulled in several directions, with each 
individual pull demanding top consideration. To properly 
conduct oversight, a member of Congress must allocate a lot 
of time, time the member just cannot seem to find. So even 
though congresssional hearings are an on-going oversight 
method, for the most part the oversight is superficial unless 
a major discrepancy or possible wrongdoing comes to light.
The North Dakota Legislature conducts full-blown 
hearings for approximately three-and-one-half months every 
two years. Other hearings during the interim are also held. 
Investigations by state legislative committees are rare.
The standing committee hearings occur during the 
biennial sessions as they hear testimony on the 12-hundred- 
plus pieces of legislation that are considered during the 
sessions. A vast majority of these bills are introduced by 
legislators either in their own interests, for constituents, 
or for local interest groups. The rest of the legislation 
consists of agency bills, also introduced by friendly 
legislators. It is during consideration of the agency bills 
that the legislative committee members get the time to 
question agency personnel and glean information about agency 
operations and programs.
The appropriations committees of both the North Dakota 
House and Senate probably dig deepest into the operations of 
the executive, but time is their enemy. In a three-and-one-
21
half month span there just is not enough time for probing 
oversight.
The legislative interim committees are charged with 
investigating possible legislation for the next session and 
in the course of their hearings will conduct some oversight 
of executive agencies. However, these committees only meet 
four or five times during the interim and once again there 
is limited time for oversight.
As mentioned earlier, the interim Budget Section com­
mittee has the potential for oversight through the withholding 
of approval for funds. An arm of the Budget Section is the 
Legislative Audit and Fiscal Review Committee, with members 
appointed by both houses. The committee is chaired by the 
Lieutenant Governor. The North Dakota Century Code, section 
54-35-02.2, states in part:
It is the duty of the Legislative Audit and Fiscal 
Review Committee to study and review audit reports 
as selected by the committee from those submitted 
by the State Auditor, confer with the auditor, and 
deputy auditors in regard to such reports, and 
when necessary to confer with representatives of 
the department, agency, or institution audited in 
order to obtain full and complete information in 
regard to any and all fiscal transactions and govern­
mental operations of any department, agency or 
institution of the state.12
The statute also directs the Attorney General to conduct 
further investigations and prosecute offenders if it is 
deemed necessary and if the committee so requests.
However, in the normal course of business the audit and 
fiscal review committee will take the reports, review them 
briefly, and accept them with few questions and little or no
22
comment. As with congressional hearings, the oversight con­
ducted by the audit and fiscal review committee is super­
ficial. The committee does not take enough time or schedule 
enough meetings during the interim to scrutinize every audit 
report. Once again, there is a very powerful oversight tool 
in the audit and fiscal review committee, if the legislature 
chose to use it, and took the time to do so.
Finally, the fact that investigating committees are 
not common in the North Dakota Legislature, does not mean 
the legislature does not investigate by committee. Again, 
turning to the North Dakota Century Code, section 54-03.2-03, 
which reads in part:
An investigating committee may exercise its powers 
during sessions of the legislative assembly, and 
also in the interim . . . when so provided by law or
by the motion, resolution, or statute by which the 
committee was established or from which it derives 
its investigatory powers.-*-3
The committee's purposes, power, duties and length of
establishment must also be stated, as well as the subject
and scope of the investigation. The investigating committee,
once formed, has the power to issue subpoenas. Once again,
it is a little used means of oversight, but one that is
available nonetheless.
Authorization and Appropriations
In the matter of authorization, both the U.S. Congress 
and the North Dakota Legislature operate the same. The 
difference probably lies in the amount of time that is taken 
to look into each program by the authorizing committee.
23
In Congress, authorization is done in the substantive 
committees after receiving a subcommittee's mark-up of a 
bill. Congressional committees have staff assigned to them 
and more time to get a good overview of the agency or 
department and its fiscal requests before recommending 
program authorization. The full committee then relies on 
the report from the subcommittee in recommending or not 
recommending program authorization.
In the North Dakota Legislature, the subcommittee 
system is basically non-existent. The standing committees 
do the authorizing after hearing all the testimony and 
looking over the figures. There is very little time and 
almost no staff available for an in-depth oversight of the 
agency or department seeking authorization.
Any bill reported out of committee (and all of them 
are) in the North Dakota Legislature, goes back to the floor 
first and then if there is a fiscal note attached which 
exceeds five thousand dollars, the bill is re-referred to 
the Appropriations Committee of that house for their con- 
siderat ion.
As an oversight tool, authorization is a very poor 
method in the state legislature and not much better in 
Congress. Appropriations, however, are very important in 
both Congress and the North Dakota Legislature.
Congressional appropriations committees can increase 
or decrease funding or maintain the same levels. Through 
this, they can exercise immense power in shaping public
24
policy. The same holds true for the appropriations com­
mittees in the North Dakota Legislature.
Congressional appropriations committees, like other 
substantive committees, have subcommittees. This means that 
authorization bills are farmed out and get a closer look.
It seems that one of the best ways to oversee any executive 
branch agency or department is to look at their spending 
patterns in relation to the effectiveness of their programs 
and their requests for continued funding. Many hard and 
pointed questions can be asked and often are in appropri­
ations hearings.
For the North Dakota Legislature the ability of the 
appropriations committees to dig deeply into agency 
activities is limited, again because of time. However, 
unlike other standing committees which meet either three 
times or two times a week during the session, the appropri­
ations committees meet five days a week. This, of course, 
allows the appropriations committees more time to dig and 
question, but on the down side, it also allows more time for 
test imony.
In recent sessions of the North Dakota Legislature, the 
House Appropriations Committee has experimented with dividing 
itself into three subcommittees to better oversee the 
appropriations process. These subcommittees hear testimony 
separately and then report back to the full committee with 
their recommendations. The jury is still out as to how 
effective this method has been. The State Senate
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Appropriations Committee has not been able to follow suit 
because they are a much smaller body.
The appropriations committees in Congress and the North 
Dakota Legislature are some of the best oversight tools 
available to the full legislative body. This is very true 
with the State Legislature, as it conducts its business 
in such a short period of time.
The General Accounting Office (GAO)
The GAO is Congress's premier field investigator.
The agency sends congress some 1,000 reports 
annually, addressing ways to root out waste and 
fraud in government programs and promote program 
performance.
The General Accounting Office is headed by the Comptroller 
General who is appointed for a single 15-year term with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The most important 
characteristic of the GAO is that it works only for 
Congress.
The work of the GAO in many cases supplements reporting 
requirements of agencies, which are written into their 
authorizing legislation. These reports from the agencies 
also number in the thousands and tend to be very vague and 
general for the most part. The reports are also far too 
numerous for members of Congress to digest in total. At its 
best, " . . .  the report requirement encourages self-evaluation 
by the executive branch and promotes agency accountability 
to Congress.Therefore, the work of the GAO is a very 
important backup method of oversight for the Congress.
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The GAO has seen a couple of major changes in its duties
in the past 15 years. In 1975, the Program Analysis Division
was created followed five years later by the Institute for
Program Evaluation. These new additions came about as a
result of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
17Act. Wxth these new additions, " . . .  GAO has created the
potential for serving as an evaluation broker, planner, and
18conduct agent for congressional committees."
The program evaluation duties of the GAO provide a 
"special type of oversight that has been specifically pro­
vided for in many agency appropriations bills since the late
1960s and in the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
19Control Act." This oversight approach is done through 
the use of surveys, cost-benefit figures and other modeling 
and efficiency studies. Obviously, the congressional staff 
has little time or resources for these studies. Thus the 
GAO takes on added importance in legislative oversight by 
Congress.
The North Dakota Legislature does not have a GAO to 
rely on, but a combination of existing agencies has created 
a similar oversight tool. The two agencies are the Legisla­
tive council and its staff of budget analysts and auditors 
and the State Auditor, which is an elected executive 
posit ion.
To get an expert's outlook on this form of legislative 
oversight in North Dakota, Chester Nelson, the Legislative 
Budget Analyst and Auditor for the Legislative Council was
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interviewed. Along with the State Auditor and Nelson's
staff of four budget analysts, Nelson adds the Legislative
Audit and Fiscal Review Committee as a player in this form
of oversight. "We have the Legislative Audit and Fiscal
Review Committee which looks at the audit process and as a
part of that, there should be a strong look at compliance
20with legislative appropriations and legislative intent."
Across the country, many states have moved the auditing 
function to the legislative branch. In June, 1990, the 
voters of North Dakota will have a chance to change the State 
constitution and move the State auditor's office from the 
executive branch to the legislative branch. Nelson does not 
believe this will create any real change. "If it were not 
for the legislature in the audit process, I don't think the 
personnel in the auditor's office would feel they have a 
constituency."^
Nelson says that over the last 20 years, almost all
changes in the audit process have been initiated by the
legislative audit and fiscal review committee. These changes
have been made, even with the fact that the actual audits
are done by the executive branch.
In terms of major direction, in terms of what the 
audits (from the State auditor) produce and the use 
of information from the audits, that is really under 
the control of the legislative branch right now.
The thrust of the audit program is really subject 
to review by legislative staff.22
While the GAO conducts performance audits of agency 
programs, North Dakota is still struggling with that. Nelson
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says it is not because of lack of interest. A resolution 
in the 1971 legislative session directed the legislative 
council to look at performance audits. According to Nelson, 
money, staff, and time have prevented implementation of any 
on-going performance audits.
However, in another area the North Dakota Legislature 
will soon be receiving better insight into the operations of 
state government, and thus better oversight of those opera­
tions. The new insight will come in the form of comprehensive 
annual financial statements of the state. They will be 
issued for the first time beginning with fiscal 1991. The 
issuance of this statement will conclude a twenty-year 
development process in this area.
All of the information gathered by the State auditor's 
office, the legislative budget analyst's office and the 
legislative audit and fiscal review committee is made 
available to state legislators. In the interim this is a 
powerful oversight group for the legislature. "We live in 
a state where the job gets done structurally, it may be one 
place or another, but both in the budget area and the
23accounting area, the legislature has a strong influence."
However, as in Congress, state legislators will only 
see the oversight value of all the information if they 
take time to digest it. It would seem logical to expect 
that some will but most will not.
These are some of the more important and effective ways 
the Congress and the Legislature have to oversee the executive
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branch. Other methods include informal contacts between 
legislators and the bureaucracy which was mentioned earlier 
and goes on quite frequently both on the national and state 
levels. There is Senate confirmation which is used with 
some effect in Congress, but with little effect in the 
North Dakota Legislature. Because the legislature meets 
only four months every two years, most of the governor's 
appointments which require Senate confirmation are made 
during the interim. Therefore, once the Senate is back in 
session, confirmation is a pro forma matter. There is also 
individual oversight which goes beyond informal contacts. 
This form of oversight was practiced most prominently on 
the national scene by Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire 
when he issued his "Golden Fleece" awards.
In North Dakota, the practice of individual oversight 
is used much more often. As stated earlier, North Dakota 
legislators are not blessed with individual staff. Many are 
reluctant to burden the Legislative Council staff and 
therefore are much more apt to visit or write department 
heads directly and do their own digging for answers. Many 
consider this just part of the job and really do not look 
at their actions as oversight. Rather, they will likely 
call it constituency service, which this study has labeled 
as an oversight tool.
In Congress, except for the occasional Proxmire, 
individual oversight is hit and miss at best, and usually
30
done only if the member of Congress can make some political 
hay back home or advance his or her reputation in Congress.
This study will now turn its attention to legislative 
oversight as seen through the eyes and experience of fourteen 
current North Dakota legislators. Before the study looks 
at the responses of the legislators, it will take a look at 
the legislative council. It has been mentioned throughout 
the early part of this study and it seems only fair to 
explain its functions. This information was gathered from 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND STAFF
The Legislative Council is described by many legislators 
as the interim "board of directors" for the North Dakota 
Legislature. It is the eyes and ears of the legislature 
during the time the body is not in session. The legislative 
audit and fiscal review committee, the Budget Section, and 
the administrative rules committee all report to the 
legislative council. The administrative rules committee 
will be discussed later in this chapter. For forty-five 
years, the Legislative Council committee and its staff have 
attempted to oversee the executive branch of North Dakota 
government.
The Legislative Council committee was created during
the 1945 legislative session. The council membership is
detailed in NDCC section 54-35-01, which reads in part:
The Legislative Council shall consist of the majority 
and minority leaders of the House and of the Senate 
plus five senators and six representatives to be 
chosen biennially before the close of each regular 
session . . . . [T]he speaker must by virtue of his
office be one of the three members appointed from 
his faction. In the Senate the council members must 
be . . . three from the majority faction and two
from the minority faction.-*-
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The Legislative Council committee's powers and duties are 
listed in NDCC section 54-35-02. There are several important 
oversight provisions in this section of the code which read 
in part:
To study, consider, accumulate, compile, and assemble 
information on any subject upon which the legisla­
tive assembly may legislate, and upon such subjects 
as the legislative assembly may . . . authorize or
direct, or any subject requested by a member of the 
legislative assembly; to collect information concern­
ing the government and general welfare of the 
state . . .; to study and consider important issues
of public policy . . .; [and] to prepare bills and
resolutions for consideration of the succeeding 
legislative assembly.^
The section also allows the council to solicit help from
other members of the legislative assembly and form committees
to help them. The council also has subpoena power.
Membership on the legislative council is highly prized
and at times legislators will actively campaign within the
party caucus for an available council appointment. A
legislator appointed to the council serves from the end of
one legislative session until the end of the next legislative
session. The legislator may be reappointed to the council
indefinitely. If a legislator resigns or is not reelected,
the member appointed to fill the vacancy must come from
the same party and sits only until the end of the next
legislative session. The members of the council also serve




While the legislative council committee of fifteen is 
prestigious, it is only as good as the legislative council 
staff. The staff consists of a group of attorneys and 
accountants who research, gather, and distribute information 
to the committee and the rest of the legislators.
The 1945 legislative council committee was the only 
interim committee of the legislature. Its basic purpose 
was to get a headstart on the next legislative session. In 
the 1949 session it was decided the committee should have 
some staff and a director and a secretary were hired. After 
quickly going through three directors, the committee hired 
Emerson Murray. Murray would remain as director for twenty- 
five years and would oversee the growth of the council to 
its current size of fifteen.
The major addition to the legislative council staff 
during Murray's tenure came in 1965 with the creation of the 
legislative budget analyst and auditor. Since 1965 the 
council staff has consisted of all attorneys and certified 
public accountants. Emerson Murray was succeeded by John 
Graham in 1975 and Graham was succeeded in 1982 by the
4council's current director, John Olsrud.
In a recent interview with John Olsrud for the purposes 
of this study, he was asked how much of the staff-work is 
concerned with legislation planned for the next session and 
how much is oversight of existing statute. "Most of what 
we do is directed to the upcoming legislative session. Most
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of the studies we are involved with, involve looking at
5prospective legislation." However, Olsrud says there are 
two committees which are directly involved with looking at 
the executive and which are staffed by the Legislative 
Council staff.
One is the legislative audit and fiscal review com­
mittee that was created in 1965. That committee has 
audit review. The state auditor or private auditors 
who do auditing of state agencies come before that 
committee and report on what they have found. The 
other committee that is involved with reviewing the 
executive branch is the administrative rules com­
mittee. This committee is about 12-years old. They 
look at all the administrative rules where the 
executive branch has taken statute and interpreted 
them and promulgated rules.®
The administrative rules committee is the legislature's 
way of checking if the executive is following legislative 
intent in interpreting and implementing legislation. The 
staff attorneys of the council become very important to the 
legislature in this process. Olsrud says every once in a 
while something the executive has done administratively does 
not set well with the legislators. "I don't think very much 
comes from misconstruing. Although we have had some 
experiences where the executive branch is doing something 
legislators don't think was intended so they will recommend
7the laws be amended."
When asked whether the council staff should be more 
directly involved in oversight, rather than just supplying 
information and advice to committees, Olsrud was somewhat
reticent in his answer.
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That is hard to say. I'm not aware of any glaring 
areas where additional oversight is needed. But I 
have 159 bosses and I'm sure a number of those 
legislators would have their own ideas about different 
aspects. But, I'm not aware of any overwhelming 
single area where there is a need for more over­
sight . 8
Much of Olsrud's hesitance in answering that question comes 
from the mission of the council as a non-partisan arm of 
the legislature. Olsrud is conscious of this at all times, 
and the council staff goes out of its way to maintain that 
neutrality. Olsrud says the non-partisan nature of the 
council staff is emphasized when the media is seeking 
information.
We are available and will always help in providing 
background information. I [Olsrud] understand, and 
the staff has to understand, there are times when 
we are the story, so then we are quotable sources.
But if we are providing background information, we 
usually ask that they [media] not quote us, simply 
because that makes us a part of the story. If most 
members of the press understand that, then we will 
be far better sources of information if they cooper­
ate. I don't think it's asking too much of them.^
Olsrud says that in most cases they try to lead the press
to a source by giving them a name of a legislator to contact
or dropping a series of not-so-subtle hints to move them in
the right direction.
As State Government has become more complex, the topic 
of the annual sessions comes up often. Up to this point, 
opposition from those who firmly believe in a parttime 
citizen legislature, has blocked any move to have the 
legislature meet every year. The idea of annual sessions 
does not sit well with John Olsrud. He feels they would 
create great problems with the legislative council staff.
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It would be very hard to operate the way we do now 
because there is so much pressure on the staff during 
that period of time and people virtually give up their 
private lives for about six months. If we were to do 
that every year, it would be a tremendous human toll.
The way it is now, we tell people we expect that of 
them. We couldn't do that if that were to happen 
every year.lu
Olsrud is referring to the fact that the legislative 
council staff researches and drafts a majority of the bills 
considered during the session. They also must check all 
bills which are drafted elsewhere for style and form. Beyond 
that, the legislative council staff has the duty of "staff­
ing" all committees of the legislature. This means that a 
member of the council staff is in attendance at all times 
to tape the proceedings, take notes, and answer procedural 
questions.
Olsrud says that each session of the legislature creates
more work for the legislative council staff. He says in
recent sessions joint legislative-executive committees have
been established which are staffed by the council. The
workload continues to grow, but Olsrud is hesitant to request
an increase in his staff.
I try very hard not to be an empire builder. One 
thing that I am not doing is pushing for more power 
or more authority or more staff or what have you.
What I see happening though, is there is a natural 
tendency as government gets more complex there are 
more and more demands on the legislature and there 
are more and more demands on the legislative council 
staff because of that. So the empire is being built 
by the legislature, so to speak.li
The legislative council staff is an extremely important 
tool for oversight by the legislature as a whole and for
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each individual legislator. However, the council staff's 
workload and small size has also become a hindrance to its 
use as an oversight tool.
While the legislators are aware of the benefit for 
oversight the council staff gives them, they are hesitant 
to use the staff because they feel the staff does not have 
time. Therefore, the obvious result is that the legislator 
uses other less effective means of oversight and lets a 
major oversight tool go untapped.
The preceding observation comes from the interviews 
with fourteen current members of the North Dakota Legislatue 
about their views on legislative oversight. It is to those 
interviews that this study now turns.
The Legislator's Viewpoint
So far in this study, oversight by Congress has been 
discussed, the oversight methods available to members of 
Congress have been compared with similar methods of over­
sight available to North Dakota legislators, and the North 
Dakot Legislative Council's oversight importance has been 
discussed. Now it is time to hear from members of the 
North Dakota Legislature about their feelings toward legis­
lative oversight.
To accomplish this, fourteen current legislators repre­
senting the Senate and the House were interviewed during 
the 11th Biennial Summit Conference, March 11-13, 1990, 
which was held on the campus of the University of North
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Dakota. The interviewees were not randomly selected in 
advance. Those interviewed were legislators who were 
available during coffee and lunch breaks or at the end of 
each day's seminars. Some were also attending interim 
committee meetings scheduled at the same time and they were 
available during breaks. The time for interviewing was 
limited, but effort was made to find a good cross-section 
of legislative experience among those legislators inter­
viewed .
Of the fourteen legislators interviewed, six are 
republicans, eight are democrats. Four are women legisla­
tors. The average years of service in the House or Senate 
or both through the November 1990 elections is 9.7 years.
The range was from two years to twenty years. Six of the 
legislators serve in the North Dakota State Senate and eight 
serve in the State House.
State Senators
Corliss Mushik (D-Mandan), Dan Wogsland (D-Hannaford), Wayne 
Stenehjem (R-Grand Forks), Jack Ingstad (R-Grand Forks), Art 
Todd (R-Jamestown), and John Olson (R-Bismarck).
State Representatives
Dan Gerhardt (D-Williston), Judy DeMers (D-Grand Forks), Bill 
Skjerven (D-Park River), Janet Wentz (R-Minot), Charles 
Mertens (D-Devils Lake), Roy Hausauer (R-Wahpeton), Diane 
Ness (D-Underwood), and Jay Graba (D-Grand Forks).
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Five questions were originally planned for each inter­
view. However, it was apparent from the first interview 
that the answers to some questions were overlapping into 
other questions. As an example, the question asked about 
the legislator's individual oversight methods many times 
also answered the question concerning their use of the 
legislative council and their feelings about the council's 
oversight powers. So, while all five questions were not 
always specifically asked in each interview eventually all 
five questions were answered in every interview.
To summarize the interviews, each question will be used 
as a heading and a summary will follow and quotes from 
some of the legislators will be used to emphasize the view­
points expressed in relation to each question.
1. What is the major oversight method available to the 
legislature as a whole while in or out of session?
There was very little hesitation on the part of any of 
the legislators in answering this question. All fourteen 
felt the appropriations and budget committees were the major 
oversight tools available to the legislature as a whole.
The legislators felt that having the ability to question the 
executive agencies about program spending and planning during 
the session, gave them some idea of what they should be 
looking for during the interim in terms of oversight. How­
ever , the legislators also took advantage of the question 
to expand on their answers. Some mentioned the Legislative
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Council staff and many used the question to voice support 
for annual sessions as an oversight tool. The annual 
session question will be dealt with separately later in 
this part of the study.
It is appropriations and budgeting that take center
stage with the legislators as an oversight tool during the
session. Representative Jay Graba of Grand Forks is a
member of the House Appropriations Committee:
We [the appropriations committee] are the budgeters 
for the State even more so than the governor. He 
gives us a plan, but the end result is what we send 
out, not necessarily what the governor requests.
So I guess we are certainly the biggest oversight 
committee.
Graba feels that because it is the appropriations committee 
which is determining the final budget numbers for each 
agency, a certain amount of control over agency actions is 
gained.
Senator Art Todd of Jamestown said, "The budget process
is the primary vehicle the legislature has to oversee the 2executive." Senator Wayne Stenehjem of Grand Forks echoed
those sentiments. "The tool that we have for oversight
largely would be the appropriations process and within that,
3the legislative statutory power to get things done."
Representative Judy DeMers of Grand Forks saw two areas of
oversight for the whole legislature.
I think two primary areas are the budget power; if 
you don't fund them they can't do it. And secondly, 
the lawmaking power. Obviously if there is something 
you really don't like you can go in and try to change 
it through the legislative process.^
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However, DeMers also sees a flip side to the issue. "On
the other hand, I think that the executive tends to basically
do what they want to do between sessions.
Finally, Representative Janet Wentz of Minot had the
most interesting answer to the question. After immediately
answering that the appropriations committees and Legislative
Council committee and staff were important in legislative
oversight, she paused and then added:
I think incumbency is very important to the legisla­
ture. We are a parttime citizen legislature and it 
takes us a number of sessions to learn the process 
and become familiar with the agencies and all of 
those funding sources.^
Not the kind of answer one would expect, but one which 
probably carries a lot of truth.
2. What oversight tools do you use as an individual 
legislator?
The answers to this question were not as cut-and-dried 
as the first question. The legislators cited constituency 
service, use of the Legislative Council staff and its 
reports, and the tracking of legislation in which they have 
taken a personal interest as means of personal oversight. 
Constituency service for North Dakota Legislators amounts 
to following up on concerns about state programs that are 
affecting individuals back home. This takes up a lot of 
the legislator's time due to the lack of any personal staff. 
The Legislative Council staff issues reports throughout the 
interim which most legislators try to read. Personal
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interest in certain areas of government is usually acquired 
from sevice on a committee that handles that issue during 
the regular session. The most interesting revelation by 
the legislators in answer to this question was the reliance 
on the media as an oversight tool.
For parttime legislators, their constituency becomes 
very important to them in keeping track of legislation and 
its implementation. What really concerns the people in the 
district is the message brought to the legislator by his or 
her constituency. It is a constituent's concerns which can 
move a legislator to take a closer look at executive agency 
policies.
A lot of times, the ones [programs] I tend to focus 
on the most are the ones I get complaints from 
constituents on. All of a sudden you find yourself 
in one area or another trying to figure out why a 
law is being implemented when you know the intent 
was quite a bit different.^
Representative Bill Skjerven of Park River feels 
constituent service is probably the best oversight tool a 
legislator has.
When I really get involved is when some constituent 
comes with some complaint. Then my solution has 
always been that I go to that agency or department 
head and start asking questions. I believe that is 
the most effective thing a legislator can do.^
The legislators also believe the legislative council
is a good tool to use in individual oversight. "You can
always go to the Legislative Council [committee] and have a
9special committee created to examine problem areas." While 
this kind of use of the legislative council seemed extreme
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for the other legislators, others did say the council helps 
keep them informed. "The legislative council really helps 
the legislature be as year round as possible. It is our 
major reporting agency.""^ Senator Art Todd feels the 
Legislative Council committee and staff are invaluable.
The Legislative Council [committee and staff] does 
have a lot of oversight power over the executive 
branch. The Legislative Council staff is extremely 
helpful, not only to the interim committee process 
and the flow of information, but it is also extremely 
beneficial to individual legislators in dealing with 
constituents . In­
state Senator Dan Wogsland of Hannaford had nothing 
but praise for the flow of information from the Legislative 
Council staff for use in oversight. He is also amazed that 
so much information can be generated by so few people. "The 
council is just excellent. They are understaffed and they
are underpaid and they need more people and there is no12question about it."
State Senator Corliss Mushik of Mandan feels that the
lack of personnel in the council is a real problem. "The
council is a very busy body. They really don't have the
time to deal with individual legislators in this kind of
13business [oversight]."
Most legislators, if they are in office long enough, 
will find themselves taking an interest in one or two issues 
and therefore dealing most closely with the executive 
agencies in charge of the programs surrounding those issues. 
These agencies then take on more importance to the legisla­
tors. As a result, the bulk of the legislator's oversight
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activities will revolve around the agencies administering
those programs in the legislator's special sphere of interest.
Freshman Representative Diane Ness of Underwood is a
member of the House Education Committee. Since the end of
the session she has found that she focuses her attention
more toward education issues. "I'll pick a couple of areas
where I like to keep track and the rest of it I have no
idea. It's just too hard to keep in contact with everything
14when you only meet once every two years." Senator Dan
Wogsland also believes each legislator strives for expertise
in certain areas. "I think each legislator has got his
15niche and watches that niche pretty closely."
As was mentioned earlier, it was surprising how many 
of the legislators mentioned the media as a valuable over­
sight tool. Six of the fourteen legislators mentioned the 
press as a source of oversight material or as a catalyst 
which can move them to check-up on an agency or department.
State Senator Jack Ingstad of Grand Forks stated the 
case for the media most strongly. "The media is probably 
the biggest overseer of the executive branch of government.
They are the ones that keep the public and the legislators16informed as to what is going on."
Other comments came from Senator Todd: "The press
keeps the agencies pretty much in-line"; Representative
Wentz: "I certainly read everything that the news media
prints and one picks up problems in there"; and Senator
17Olson: "Quite often media stories may cause action."
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While the media was never mentioned as an oversight 
tool for Congress, it would seem that in a small state like 
North Dakota, the state legislators rely on the media quite 
often. This is not all that surprising if one considers 
North Dakota's liberal open records and open meetings laws, 
which allow the press the access to and the ability to write 
about almost anything that goes on in State government.
With no staff, and very little time spent in Bismarck it 
seems logical that the State's legislators would turn to the 
press to help them in oversight of the executive branch 
during the interim.
Before leaving this question of individual oversight, 
the study would be remiss if it did not mention the comments 
of the one legislator out of the fourteen that is not all 
that concerned with individual oversight on his part.
Senator Jack Ingstad says his input is very little and he 
is satisfied with the information he receives from Legisla­
tive Council committee and staff.
I may be different than most. I feel comfortable 
with the executive branch of government. They 
are elected by the people just like the legislature.
I am one that feels they should be given some leeway 
in the decision making process. We are not in 
Bismarck most of the time and I feel comfortable for 
the executive branch to be making decisions for us 
within the framework of our legislation that we 
pass each session.^
3. Should the legislative council staff have more power?
All fourteen of the legislators interviewed felt the 
Legislative Council staff was a valuable oversight tool
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and that their information and research was tremendous.
One would think then that the legislators would want a
council staff with even more power. However, that was not
the case in these interviews. Only two of the legislators
felt the council staff should be more powerful.
One who feels that the legislative council staff is
fine with the power that it has is former House Speaker and
twenty year veteran of the House, Roy Hausauer, of Wahpeton.
Hausauer believes, "The staff has enough power to enter the
agencies and is very knowledgeable. They are the backbone
19of the legislative council committee."
Senator Wayne Stenehjem left no doubt about his feelings
on the matter of the power of the legislative council staff.
They are resource people and drafting people. They 
do not have nor do they ever attempt, that I am 
aware of, to exercise any influence over the executive 
branch. Nor could they. They just don't have the 
statutory authority and that's not what they are set 
up for.20
Representative Charles Mertens of Devils Lake,
current chairman of the legislative council committee, begs
to differ with Stenehjem. "We've got some tools in place
through the legislative council [committee]. We've got the
audit and fiscal review committee and the other strong one
is the Budget Section. It has a lot of statutory 
21authority." While Mertens is referring to the legisla­
tive council committee, by inference he is also including 
the staff. The powers of the council committee are visited 
upon the staff. It is the staff that carries out the 
council's wishes and supplies it with information.
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Senator John Olson believes the legislative council
staff has plenty of power. However, according to Olson,
"There is a general reluctance by the legislative council
22to get involved."
The reluctance on the part of the legislative council
staff probably stems from its non-partisan mission which
was mentioned earlier. Representative Judy DeMers also sees
this reluctance as a drawback while still feeling that the
council staff could use more power.
I would like to see it [council staff] strengthened.
I think part of the great value is that they are 
non-partisan. That is also part of the great problem. 
They bend over backwards, in terms of the message 
about what is going on, not to bias that message 
with any kind of particular focus. Sometimes it takes 
awhile to understand what they are sending out. So,
I would like to see it be more investigative.23
While some feel some changes could be made and others
have differing viewpoints as to the council's duties, most
seem to feel that the current power base of the council is
enough.
4. As a legislator, do you find certain agencies harder 
to oversee than others?
The resounding answer to this was "yes" and the 
Department of Human Services led the way as the hardest 
agency to oversee. Also mentioned were the Departments of 
Higher Education and Public Instruction, and the Highway 
Department.
This question created one or two sentence answers for 
the most part. State Senator Corliss Mushik summed up the
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problem with human services. "They have such a myriad of
programs that there is absolutely no way that I as an
individual who does not work in the department or work
24putting that budget together can really understand."
State Senator John Olson also believes that the size of 
the department dictates how hard the department is to 
oversee.
It's always easier to pick on the little guy because 
it is not too difficult to find out what he is doing 
and how he is doing it. It's more difficult to pick 
on the big ones like human services, or higher 
education or the highway department, because there 
are so many programs and so many areas of regulation. 
It's almost impossible for any individual to have a 
handle on all of that.^5
Representative Jay Graba does not seem to see a problem
with any agency, large or small. "I have always felt that
departments have all been accessible and answered my 
2 6questions." Senator Dan Wogsland was a little more
philosophical in his answer. "There are a lot of different
agencies that are more accessible just simply because the
27people in charge are more accessible."
The greater the number of funding sources and the 
greater the number of money transfers seems to dictate 
which agencies legislators consider hardest to oversee.
5. When you leave the Capitol after three-and-one-half 
months in session, do you feel like you are turning 
the fox loose in the hen house?
This question was designed to be a "fun" question, but 
also one that would pull together all the legislator's
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thoughts about oversight. It was hoped the question would 
cause the legislators to take a second look and decide 
whether the fox [the executive branch] is in fact loose in 
the hen house.
Rather than trying to summarize the legislator's 
answers and then give a few examples, for this question 
each legislator's name will be listed with his or her 
answer immediately following.
Senator Corliss Mushik: "Just about the minute after I 
leave. As soon as we've left the premises, it's almost as 
if they [executive personnel] give this enormous sigh of 
relief, go about their business and you [legislators] really 
don't have any idea what is happening."2 °
29Senator John Olson: "I have never felt that way."
Representative Diane Ness: "I don't know that I would go 
that far. I just know that it is awfully hard for legisla­
tors to keep track of everything that is going on when you 
only meet every other year.
Representative Jay Graba: "As of right now, I think the 
oversight is there. I really do. I don't think that we 
lack it. " 31
Senator Jack Ingstad: "The legislature shouldn't be too
concerned with overseeing those executive branches. We 
direct, at the very beginning, the budget and the duties 
and if they don't fulfill those responsibilities, then the 
people, every four years, have the responsibility to remove 
t hem. " 3 3
Representative Roy Hausauer: "It is hard to say. After
we do leave the session, I do find things change. We are 
not there 24-hours a day anymore and things do change after 
you leave, absolutely. " 33
Senator Art Todd: "You find, I think, that the agencies
are watching their 'Ps' and 'Qs' very carefully when the 
legislature is in session. They perhaps slacken a little 
bit as time goes on once the legislature leaves town. How­
ever, I don't think I've seen any blatant abuses. So, I 
don't see any real foxes running rampant through the hen 
house."34
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Senator Dan Wogsland: "I think a lot more can be done 
oversee the executive. Certainly the legislature has 




Representative Dan Gerhardt: "You have to count on the 
bureaucrat to implement and run the programs. You have to 
have that faith in them. But you should also be able, 
every off-year, to come in and check on the implementation
of the programs."36
Senator Wayne Stenehjem: "Sometimes you work and say, 'I
hope what we just got done passing is what they [the 
executive branch] will do.' But as I have said many times 
during the legislature, 'we will always be back.' I think 
that the people in the executive branch remember that. We 
will be back."37
Representative Judy DeMers: "I don't. I guess I basically
trust the executive unless they do otherwise and then you 
follow up on it."38
Representative Bill Skjerven: "I don't have that feeling."3
Representative Charles Mertens: "It could be. I have 
never gotten that feeling. I know a lot of legislators have 
complained about that. My personal opinion, after twenty 
years of service in the legislature, is that the executive 
branch has just not abused their power that much."40
Representative Janet Wentz: "I've never felt that way. I
have always had a lot of faith and confidence in our public 
employees. I think we have to operate that way. Until that 
confidence is proven to be misplaced, then I'll be satisfied 
that we have done our job and they can be relied upon to do 
theirs."41
It seems the feeling of these fourteen legislators is 
one of a little bit of worry, once in a while, about leaving 
the executive by itself with money and programs, but not a 
lot of great concern. Except for Senator Mushik, who 
definitely sees the fox running loose and Senator Wogsland 
who fears too much delegation of power, the others seem 




As stated earlier, a question about annual sessions was
not asked as part of the survey. However, annual sessions
as an oversight tool was mentioned by nine of the fourteen
legislators during the course of the interviews. All of
those who mentioned annual sessions cited the need for
closer oversight of the executive budget as the primary
reason. The following consists of four examples:
Senator Corliss Mushik: "I believe we should have annual 
sessions. I think the fact that we have to project appropri­
ations budgeting two and sometimes three years in advance 
in today's world is ridiculous."42
Senator John Olson: "I've advocated in the last couple of
years that we go to annual sessions. Many of these budgets, 
like human services, are very complex and difficult to 
understand. So taking a look at it every two years just 
doesn't make this thing work very well anymore.
Senator Dan Wogsland: "We try to do too much with too 
little. You are not going to run a billion dollar business 
meeting four months every two years. Government isn't a 
business, but we [legislators] are the board of directors, 
we are the managers of the State, and you can't properly 
manage in that way. I think North Dakota's got to quickly 
come to the day when we go to the annual sessions and 
expand our role.
Representative Dan Gerhardt: "We need a nineteen-day 
session in the off-years to check what's going on. We need 
to check and see what legislation has been implemented, how 
it's been implemented, and what can be done to correct it. 
It's kind of like being a Monday morning quarterback."45
A change to annual sessions does not need a constitu­
tional amendment unless the eighty-day limit is to be 
changed. A change would not need a vote of the people. The 
legislature can divide up the session any way it sees fit, 
as long as the total of legislative days does not exceed 
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
Oversight, whether it be in Congress or the North 
Dakota Legislature is tough to measure. This study has 
shown that both legislative bodies have an abundance of 
oversight tools. It has also shown, that while members of 
Congress and the State Legislature are aware of their over­
sight responsibilities, few choose to use the tools given 
them on a regular basis or to their fullest extent.
The North Dakota Legislature
Members of the North Dakota Legislature are very aware 
of the independence of the executive branch in the time 
between legislative sessions. However, it seems the State's 
lawmakers are content with occasional questioning of execu­
tive agencies or their own faith in the executive's integrity, 
rather than aggressive oversight, to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness in spending and program implementation.
For the most part, members of the North Dakota Legisla­
ture cannot be faulted for their lack of aggressive oversight. 
They are parttime lawmakers. While some are retired farmers.
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laborers, or businessmen, the majority hold down full-time 
jobs in the private sector. It is those jobs and not their 
legislative salaries that put food on the table.
The work they do for constitutents, the time spent 
attending interim committee meetings and reading pages of 
information sent out by the legislative council staff, must 
all be balanced against the time needed to earn their real 
living.
Only a handful of the State's legislators live in or 
near the capitol city. For most, any personal oversight 
meetings with agencies will involve many miles and many hours 
of driving. There is also the problem of staff. The State 
legislators do not have personal staff. Therefore, every 
visit, every letter, and every phone call, must be handled 
by the individual legislator.
Time is the real enemy of those serving in the North 
Dakota Legislature. There is not enough time during the 
interim to balance job and legislative oversight duties.
While in session, the eighty day time limit leaves very 
little time for proper oversight hearings by the committees. 
Every bill introduced must have at least one hearing and 
be voted on at least once on the floor of either the House 
or Senate. In past sessions the bill load has climbed close 
to fifteen-hundred.
Many feel that annual sessions would help the legisla­
ture lighten its load and do a better job of oversight. 
However, unless the time limit of eighty days is expanded.
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those feelings may not be well grounded. The time in each 
session would be split in some way, but it could not exceed 
eighty days. There is also no indication that the bill 
load would lighten.
During the interviews, the legislators did not mention 
bureaucratic expertise. However, there does not seem to 
be much doubt, that as State Government in North Dakota 
becomes more complex, the bureaucracy will become more 
expert, which could be a negative or positive factor for 
legislators in oversight of the executive branch. While the 
legislators could tap into the expertise of the bureaucracy 
to better educate themselves, they could also find them­
selves plowed under by jargon and technology and therefore 
shy away from any effective oversight. For many legislators, 
as the expertise of the bureaucracy grows, so should their 
faith in the executive.
While North Dakota's legislators can find aggressive 
oversight difficult for all the reasons cited above, there 
is one area of fault that falls on the legislators because 
of and not in spite of the reasons cited above. In the 
course of this study it has become clear that legislative 
oversight is difficult for the parttime legislature. At 
the same time it has become clear that the legislators have 
not educated themselves as to the oversight tools available 
to them and the amount of oversight power they actually 
possess. It would seem, that with all the difficulties the
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legislator has in conducting oversight, education about the 
tools available would be primary.
The legislators seem hesitant to use the legislative 
council staff even though they have high praise for the 
council's work. The legislators seem unaware of the 
tremendous oversight possibilities of the audit and fiscal 
review committee, the Budget Section, and the administrative 
rules committee. They also seem unaware of the oversight 
possibilities held by the interim committees. The tool box 
is in place and over time new tools are added. However, if 
the legislator does not know what the tools can accomplish 
or how to use them, then the whole tool box is a waste of 
time.
Legislative oversight is nothing more than holding the 
executive branch of government accountable. In North 
Dakota, the top State officials are elected by the people. 
However, this does not guarantee accountability. Account­
ability is the duty of the legislature. While time may be 
the enemy of the North Dakota Legislator, it is no excuse 
for ignorance of the means available to oversee the executive.
We do have legislative oversight in North Dakota. Of 
that there is no question. There is a question as to the 
quality of that oversight. Even under a system which only 
brings the legislature together once every two years, the 
methods for excellent oversight are in place. However, 
the North Dakota Legislature, not unlike its counterpart in
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